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1 Abbreviations 
AI – Amnesty International 
CAT = Convention Against Torture 
CmAT – Committee against Torture 
CESCR  – Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
CERD – International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
CIL – Customary International Law 
CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child 
DoP – Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
ECHR – European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR – European Court on Human Rights 
EJIL – European Journal of International Law 
ESC – Economic and Social Council 
EU – European Union 
FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
FMLN – Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional 
GA Res – (UN) General Assembly Resolution 
GC IV – Fourth Geneva Convention 
OPI – First Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
OPII – Second Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
HRC – Human Rights Committee 
HRW – Human Rights Watch 
IA – The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
ICC – International Criminal Court 
ICCPR =International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICHR – Independent Commission for Human Rights 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
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ICL – International Criminal Law 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IDF – Israeli Defence Forces 
IHL – International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL – International Human Rights Law 
ILC – International Law Commission 
IO – International Organization 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
OCHA – (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PA – Palestinian Authority (Palestinian National Authority)  
PCHR – Palestinian Center for Human Rights 
PHRMG – Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group 
PLC – Palestinian Legislative Council 
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization 
PSF – Palestinian Security Forces 
oPt – occupied Palestinian territory 
RCHRS – Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies 
SC – Security Council 
TNC – Trans-National Corporation 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN – United Nations 
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly 
 
 
 
 
  5
2 Introduction 
From a traditional state-centred perspective, the state, and only the state, is the 
ultimate bearer of human rights obligations. The human rights of individuals are 
protected from breaches by non-state actors through state responsibility, either by 
attribution to the state, or through the state’s duty to act in due diligence to protect 
from horizontal abuses of human rights1 There is an emerging view, one that 
advocates direct responsibilities of certain non-state actors.2 
The Palestinian Authority3, a local autonomous regime bearing many traits of a 
government, but lacking statehood, falls outside of the traditional category of human 
rights obligations bearers. As an actor whose behaviour amounts to breaches of 
human rights, its international responsibility for these breaches are of importance, 
and should be of the human rights movement’s interest. It’s the ambition of this essay 
to shed some light on the question. 
 
2.1 Purpose 
The aim of this essay is to examine the responsibility for PA acts against the 
Palestinian population that amount to violations of human rights. This will involve an 
assessment whether Israel can be held responsible, either through attribution to the 
state, or because of its due diligence responsibility. It will likewise entail the question 
if PA has a direct human rights responsibility of its own, and, if so, whether it is bound 
by its unilateral undertakings to respect human rights. It is further my ambition to 
briefly describe the existing human rights monitoring and enforcement system in the 
occupied Palestinian territory4. What elements constitute it, and how does it deal with 
the question of responsibility? 
 
                                                            
1 Hessbruegge (2006) p27 
2 Clapham (2006) Ch1 
3 Also called Palestinian National Institution (PNA), hereinafter PA 
4 Hereinafter oPt 
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2.2 A theoretical background 
Andrew Clapham detects three main approaches to the issue of non-state actors’ 
responsibilities under International Human Rights Law5; 1) The state is the only 
subject under international human rights law, and the only entity that should be a 
subject. The individual is protected from abuses by non-state actors through the 
states’ due diligence obligations, as well as by the rules of attribution. 2) States are 
still the only subjects of international human rights law, while important non-state 
actors have gained considerable power and capacity to breach human rights, and 
should be made subjects to IHRL. 3) Clapham’s own view: Non-state actors are 
presently bound by human rights law. This can be proven by evidence in present 
practice.6 
Paying special respect to “Non-State Actors in Times of Armed Conflict” (the closest 
we get to PA), Clapham argues that such movements do have human rights 
obligations deriving from customary norms.7 
Reinisch is less inclined to admit that a legal human rights obligation presently is 
binding non-state actors. He starts off from the view that the whole human rights 
framework has expanded from being merely a legal one binding states, to 
incorporating other elements, such as moral standards binding on a broader array of 
actors than traditional states.(however, Reinisch focuses on TNC, NGOs and IOs, 
rather than armed groups or de facto regimes). He detects two main developments; 
1) Unilateral non-legal undertakings such as codes of custom. 2) With a special focus 
on TNCs, an increased practice of extraterritorial due diligence state responsibility is 
a second development enhancing non-state actors’ human rights responsibility and –
compliance. This has led to new means of accountability; holding accomplices 
responsible in case the main perpetrator can’t, extra-legal means as boycotts etc, 
enforcing human rights of non-states regardless of whether they are strictly speaking 
legally bound by IHRL. In summary Reinisch could be said to belong to the second 
category of scholars according to Clapham’s framework, admitting the prospects and 
                                                            
5 Hereinafter IHRL 
6 Clapham (2006) Ch1 
7 Ibid. Ch7 
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desirability of a human rights framework extending to non-state actors, but holing that 
in its present state, the international human rights framework is not capable of 
holding non-state actors directly responsible under international law.8  
Zegveld is likewise precautious to hold that human rights obligations for de facto 
regimes exist, referring mainly to ambiguous and lacking international practice, but 
giving some authority to the argument that “human rights instruments could govern 
armed opposition groups exercising governmental functions.” The main issue is 
however that “armed opposition groups apparently lacking any effectiveness 
accountable for human rights violations.” 9 
Hessbruegge seems to be of the same opinion. Individuals are protected from human 
rights abuses committed by non state actors, de facto regimes included, through 
rules of state attribution as well as the due diligence responsibility of states. There 
are “emerging” responsibilities for de facto regimes, It is not yet, however, possible to 
conclude that these actors are directly bound by human rights law, other than by “soft 
law”.10 
It is within the above discussion that the author wants to place this essay and 
hopefully make a contribution. 
 
2.3 Method and scope 
I have combined doctrinal legal method based on the examination of treaties, case 
law, scholarly literature and “soft” legal sources, with empirical method involving 
qualitative analysis of material such as personal interviews with relevant actors in the 
field of human rights in oPt, and written material such as reports, academic writings 
from disciplines of the social sciences. 
For reasons of spatial and temporal limitations of this paper I have chosen not to 
extend the scope to the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, but will only focus 
                                                            
8 Non‐State Actors and Human Rights  (2005) pp37‐89 
9 Zegveld (2002) p151 
10 Hessbruegge (2005) p35 
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on the Ramallah-based PA caretaking government. Neither will it explore Israel’s 
responsibility for its own acts in oPt. This paper further focuses on human rights, and 
not on International Humanitarian Law11 or International Criminal Law12, even though 
these bodies of law will be briefly covered in the beginning. 
 
2.4 The status of the oPt in international law 
All of oPt is considered occupied by Israel among the international community. This 
was clearly spelled out in the Wall advisory opinion in 2004, and is confirmed by the 
Goldstone Report.13 This includes all of the parts of the West Bank transferred to PA 
and all of the Gaza Strip, even after Israel’s “Disengagement” after 2005.  
 
This fact triggers the international law of belligerent occupation, and more precisely 
the 4th Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations. Israel has not ratified OPI or 
OPII to the Geneva Conventions, but parts of these treaties have reached the status 
of CIL, and thus bind Israel.14 
The Palestinians is recognized as a people with a right to self-determination.15 
As to the international status of PA, a clear and authoritative definition is nowhere to 
be found. First of all, the Oslo Accords agreements are “remarkably unforthcoming on 
issues of status, no doubt because of fundamental disagreements between the parties”16, to borrow 
the words from James Crawford. The status of PA during the interim period is not 
defined 
                                                            
11 Hereinafter IHL 
12 Hereinafter ICL 
13 Goldstone Report para. 76‐79 pp85‐86 
14 Goldstone Report para 272 p 84 
15 Goldstone Report para. 269 p82, Wall advisory Opinion  paras. 149, 155, 159 
16 The Reality of International Law: Essays in honour of Ian Brownlie (2003) p 119 
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Subsequent authoritative legal assessments of issues relating to oPt are likewise 
silent on the issue. The ICJ 2004 Wall advisory opinion provides no further 
explanation. Neither does the 2009 Goldstone Report. 
 
2.4.1 International Humanitarian Law 
Israel has continuously held that IHRL doesn’t apply to oPt17 and that the legal 
regime to refer to is IHL. As noted by, for example, the authors of Occupation, 
Colonialism, Apartheid?18, this represents a traditional view that IHL and IHRL are 
mutually exclusive. 
It is today however accepted that IHRL applies in situations of armed conflict. The 
point of breakthrough came in 1996 with an ICJ Advisory Opinion where it was 
spelled out that IHL has the role of Lex Specialis in relation to IHRL. Only human 
rights treaty articles derogated from seize to apply in times of armed conflict.19 
With a special reference to oPt, ICJ in 2004 confirmed this view, and held that Israel 
is bound by human rights instruments in oPt.20 The Human Rights Committee has 
likewise held that: 
 
“in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the 
population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party’s authorities or agents 
in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within 
the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law.”21 
 
 
It has further been spelled out that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the 
oPt in its entirety, and further, applying art 7 and art 47 of the Convention to the case, 
                                                            
17 Wall Advisory Opinion para. 102 
18 Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? (2009) p33 ff 
19 Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1996 
20 Wall Advisory Opinion (2004), P178 para106 
21 UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations: Israel ( 2003) Para. 11 
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considering the Oslo accords a “special agreement”, the Palestinians to be “protected 
persons” within the scope of the convention, even after the transfer of power to PA. 
Israel then retains an IHL responsibility in relation to Palestinians residing in PA-
controlled areas even in the post-Oslo context.22 
For the present purpose I will then consider Israel to be bound by IHRL in oPt. 
Israel’s responsibility for its own acts in areas of the West Bank under its control 
should then be of less interest, as it has been confirmed that the state has a 
responsibility under IHRL. 
The applicability of IHL to non-state actors such as PA and Palestinian armed groups 
is likewise straightforward. It’s generally recognized that IHL (common art 3 as well 
as OPII) applies to non-state actors in armed conflict. With the words in the 
Goldstone Report: 
“It should be noted that the same issue [as with human right responsibility of non-state actors] 
does not arise with regard to IHL obligations, the question being settled some time ago[…] it is 
well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether States or non-State actors, are bound 
by international humanitarian law”23 
Israel has not ratified OPII, but is however bound by common article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions relating to “armed conflict not of an international character”. 
This is also considered CIL, effectively binding PA.24 Many rights of fundamental 
importance provided by IHRL are covered by common article 3 and are thus binding 
on PA. 
 
2.4.2 International Criminal Law 
The 1998 Rome Conference provides for international obligations that directly bind 
individuals, whether acting on behalf of a state or as a non-state actor.25 The crimes 
covered by the statute include particularly severe breaches of human rights, namely 
                                                            
22 Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? (2009) pp79‐81 
23 Goldstone Report, para. 304 
24 List of state signatories to OPII 
25 Clapham (2006) p14‐15 
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genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.26 The 
rules are also generally accepted as customary international law.27 
The Rome Statute then establishes obligations as well as provides (potential) 
mechanisms for accountability for individuals PA officials committing severe 
international crimes, of which are contained in human rights instruments. 
An important observation to make at this stage is that the individual international 
obligations stemming from ICL apply whether we confer the general human rights 
responsibility to Israel, or directly to PA. 
 
2.5 A Historical Snapshot: Israel, PA and the Oslo Process 
This is not the place for a detailed historiography of a topic that has been covered in 
meters of academic and journalistic literature, and is subject to one of the biggest 
controversies of our time. In order to provide the necessary background for this paper 
I will attempt to trace the broad lines. 
The Gaza Strip and West Bank, administered by Egypt since 1949 and annexed by 
Jordan in 1950 respectively, were occupied by Israel during the June War in 1967. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was set up in 1964 with the aim of 
abolishing the State of Israel which was established in 1948, based on its claim of 
representing the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination.28 It was 
awarded observer status in the UNGA in 1974. 
Following the Palestinian uprising that started in 1987 (the first intifada) and the 
Palestinian Declaration of Independence (the Aligiers Declaration) in 1988 which 
included a de facto recognition of the State of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, 
several peace initiatives were initiated. The so-called Oslo process succeeded and 
                                                            
26 Rome Statute art. 5(1) 
27 Clapham (2006) p15 
28 See for example:Original Palestine National Charter (1964) art. 17 “The Partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and 
the establishment of Israel are illegal and false regardless of the loss of time, because they were contrary to the 
wish of the Palestine people and its natural right to its homeland, and in violation of the basic principles 
embodied in the charter of the United Nations, foremost among which is the right to self‐determination.” 
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resulted in the first Israeli-Palestinian peace accord (the Declaration of Principles) in 
September 1993 with the aim of concluding a full-fledged peace agreement within 
five years. In a separate exchange of letters, the PLO was recognized by Israel as 
the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and PLO recognized explicitly 
the State of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. 
Through various bilateral agreements between PLO and Israel, within the framework 
of the Oslo Process, the Palestinian Authority was established, to serve as an interim 
self-government body, while awaiting final status negotiations. Such final status has 
yet not been agreed upon, and after the failed “Camp David” Summit negotiations in 
2000 and the eruption of the second intifada“, peace efforts such as the Roadmap to 
Peace and the Arab Peace Initiative have failed to settle a final solution. 
In the meantime PA was established as a non-sovereign interim self-government 
body with unclear status. The “state formation” process involved the establishment of 
a governance structure consisting of a parliament (the Palestinian Legislative 
Council), a judiciary and an executive administration, where among a large police- 
and security sector took part. 
The coming of the second intifada in 2000, resulted in Israel in 2002 reoccupying 
most areas under PA’s command with the destruction of major elements of its 
infrastructure, as well as the marginalization of then president Yasser Arafat and 
organizational change with, for example, the creation of a prime minister post29 
In 2005 Israel, “disengaged” from the Gaza Strip, removed the Israeli settlers until 
then residing in the area, and claimed the territory no longer occupied. This argument 
has however been rejected by the international community, and the Gaza Strip has 
been held to be an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt).30 
Following the election victory of the opposition party the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas) in January 2006, and prolonged strife with the former ruling 
party, Fatah, oPt was split between the Fatah, and Hamas, the former seizing control 
                                                            
29 See for example Robinson (1997), Parsons (2005), State Formation in Palestine (2004), Brown (2003) 
30  Diakonia (2009) 
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over the West Bank, forming a PA “caretaking government” under Prime Minister 
Salam Fayyad, while Hamas set up its own de facto administration in the Gaza Strip. 
It is this Ramallah-based “caretaking government” which will presently be referred to 
when dealing with PA. 
As of April 2010 new PA presidential elections have not been held but are planned to 
be held in July the same year.31 
 
2.6 Human Rights in oPt 
The human rights situation under the rule of PA leaves a lot to wish. The situation 
has been deteriorating, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007 West Bank-Gaza 
Strip split with heightened internal political tensions, exposing members of Hamas 
and other political opposition groups to grave breaches of human rights.32 
One aspect of this is the prevalence of arbitrary detention on political grounds giving 
rise to breaches of the right to Due Process.33 
ICHR further reports on violations of the right to life, stemming from serious flaws in 
PA prosecution routines following “honour killings” directed at women34, cases of 
death in detention centres35 etc. 
The right to physical safety is likewise severely breached. Torture and ill-treatment by 
police and security forces, and in detention, occurs frequently, occasionally resulting 
in deaths. Instances of alleged enforced disappearance are likewise observed.36 
ICHR further notes flawed procedures of effective remedies for these abuses.37 
                                                            
31 Palestinian Authority approves July elections in West Bank 
32 Internal Fight (2008) p9ff 
33 14th Annual Report ICHR p71ff 
34 14th Annual Report ICHR p54ff 
35 Ibid p56 
36 Ibid 59 ff 
37 Ibid p65 
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Political rights like the Right to Freedom of Opinion and expression and Freedom of 
Assembly are likewise reported to be breached on a systematic basis.38 
 
3 Why PA is not a sovereign state 
A precondition for this paper is that PA is a non-state actor. Had the entity been a 
state it had unquestionably been bound by customary principles of human rights, and 
it should be allowed to enter into human rights treaties. 
The view among, for example human rights treaty monitoring bodies, is that PA is not 
a state, which is why the organization has not been allowed to sign any treaties. The 
(national) courts that have addressed the issue are likewise agreeing on the 
standpoint; PA is not a state. Most scholars having looked at the issue seem to be of 
the same view. A few, however a minority, are of the opinion that PA constitutes a 
Palestinian state. Although not a major element of this paper, I will outline the 
discussion below. 
There are two conflicting legal theories relating to the issue of statehood. The 
prevailing one, the declaratory theory holds that in determining an entity’s statehood 
an objective test must be applied. This is largely accepted as CIL and is codified into 
the regional binding treaty, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States (1933). The test for statehood consists of four elements: That the entity has 
(1) a defined territory, (2) a permanent population, (3) is under the control of its own 
government, and that it (4) engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal 
relations with other such entities.39 
The rivalling theory, the constitutive theory, applies the subjective test of an entity’s 
status of recognition (or non-recognition) among other states. It is then up to the 
discretion of other states to determine the existence of statehood by recognizing or 
not recognizing an entity as a state. If an entity is recognized as a state, then it is a 
state. This theory has been criticized for being subjective and politicizing the question 
                                                            
38 Ibid p130 ff 
39 Crawford (2006) p142 ff 
  15
of statehood. It represents a minority view, is seen as archaic and is presently 
generally not accepted as CIL.40 
The conflict, broadly speaking, is then one of granting the judiciary or the executive 
the power to determine status of statehood.41 
 
3.1 Ungar v. PLO 
In a ruling from the American Court of Appeal, concerning the question of whether PA 
is to be granted state immunity, it was held: 
“This standard deems a state to be ‘an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity 
to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.’ Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations  201 (1987)”42, 
and that: 
“political recognition […] is not a prerequisite to a finding of statehood.” 
Thus US domestic law provides for an objective test for statehood (declaratory), 
applying the same fourthfold test as the one provided by the Montevideo Convention 
1933. 
In the aforementioned case the US Court of Appeals, argues that the statehood of 
PA is supported by tests 1,2 and 4, but not by the 3rd, and therefore does not have 
the status of a state. 
The court argues that: 1) under the initial period, prior to 1967, Mandate Palestine 
was first under Ottoman, then under British and finally under Egyptian/ Jordanian/ 
Israeli rule. There existed no sovereign Palestinian state. GA Res 181, calling for an 
independent Arab state, is normative and does not in effect create a Palestinian 
state. 2) This remains unchanged from the June War (Six Days War) in 1967 to the 
                                                            
40 Crawford (2006) p142 ff 
41 Harpaz 2007, p204‐5 
42 Ungar  v. Palestine Liberation Organization, para. 34 
  16
Interim Agreement (1994). Res 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from areas occupied 
during the war no more than Res 181 creates a state. 3) Also during this final period 
a Palestinian state fails to come into being due to the limited character of PA’s control 
of territories under its command.43 
Two recent Israeli court decisions have come to the same conclusion.44 
While a minority of scholars, such as Curtis Doebbler, have argued that the 
Montevideo test, applied on the Palestinian case, reveals the existence of Palestinian 
statehood,45 scholars like Dajani46, James Crawford47 and Eyal Benvenisti48 
denounce this argument and come to the same conclusion as the courts above. 
Although an interesting question, this is not the place for a thorough analysis of the 
statehood of PA. I will let this serve as a sufficient demonstration that for the purpose 
of the current paper, PA does not qualify as a state, and should for the present 
purpose be treated like a non-state actor. 
 
3.2 If not a state, then what is PA? 
If we accept that PA is not a state with full legal personality, our next task is to try to 
define what it is. The Interim Agreement explicitly declares one of the aims to be the 
creation of a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority”.49  
                                                            
43 See minority opinion of Judge Drori in Irena Litvack Norwich v. the Palestinian Authority 2003  for a similar 
analysis. Whereas the majority, on the question of PA’s right  to court immunity, apply a constitutive test of 
(Israeli) recognition, Drori applies the Montevideo Convention declarative test upon which PA fails all four 
criteria for statehood.   
44 Harpaz (2007) pp198‐211 
45 Doebbler (2009) 
46 Dajani (1996), pp82‐89 
47 Crawford (2006) 
48 The Arab‐Israeli Accords (1996) p58‐59 
49 DoP  art. 1 
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The authors of the 2009 report Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? suggest 
Benvenisti’s “autonomous regime” as an appropriate denominator. They explicitly 
leave the question of the legal implication of such an entity unanswered.50 
Dajani takes a similar hold. After having denounced Palestinian statehood he 
describes PA as an ‘interim local government body’.51 
The terms “Quasi-state” and “Client-state” are used by Khan, in order to visualize 
PA’s continued economical and political dependence on Israel.52 
Others have named it a “de facto regime”.53 
 
4 A state-centred approach  
Having concluded that PA does not qualify as a sovereign state, the next task will be 
to assess the responsibility for abuses of human rights committed by the authority. 
In the following paragraphs I will consider Israel’s possible responsibility for human 
rights breaches committed by PA. First, whether PA acts could be attributed to the 
state of Israel, and secondly, whether Israel could have a due diligence responsibility 
to protect Palestinians in oPt from acts committed by PA, amounting to violations of 
human rights.  
 
4.1 Is PA conduct attributable to Israel? 
It has for long been acknowledged as general rules of PIL that states may be 
responsible for wrongful acts of individuals or bodies that are not directly a part of the 
state per se.54 The rules of state attribution have been codified by ILC in the Draft 
                                                            
50 Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? (2009) pp73‐75 
51 Dajani (1996) 
52 State Formation in Palestine (2004) pp13‐60 
53 Not only the state (2006) p65 
54 Hessbruegge (2006) p48 
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Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter “Draft 
Articles”) and adopted by UNGA in 2001, are generally accepted as CIL55, and are 
thus binding upon Israel. 
 
4.1.1 Legal base 
As to the interpretation of human rights treaties, the Vienna Convention provides: 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: […] any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”56 
 
The Commentaries to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts57  are further 
 “concerned with the whole field of State responsibility”.58 
Human Rights treaties should be included therein. 
 
It appears justifiable then to interpret the relevant human rights treaties in the light of 
these general international rules of state attribution. 
 
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has further held in a judgement that the 
international rules of attribution are applicable in the human rights field. 
 
“Any impairment of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of international law to 
the action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which 
assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the [Inter-American] Convention [on Human 
Rights].”59 
 
                                                            
55 Hessbruegge (2005) p48 
56 Vienna Convention art. 31(3) 
57 Hereafter Commentaries 
58 Commentaries to the Draft Articles (2001) para. 0(5) 
59 Velasquez Rodriguez Case para. 164 
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ECtHR in the Ilaşcu case took a similar view.60 The articles have also been applied to 
de facto regimes with a special reference to breaches of human rights (and 
humanitarian law) by the UN Commission on Human Rights, which held that the acts 
of Hezbollah and other de facto regimes  
“are classified, under the law on State responsibility, as acts of the State to the extent that  
such authorities are in fact exercising elements of governmental authority in the absence or 
default of the official authorities, and in circumstances which call for the exercise of such 
authority”61 
 
It is further confirmed by a HRC General Comment62 that states are responsible for 
human right breaches of their agents outside of their territory. From this follows that 
the question whether PA-land is regarded as occupied by Israel, or not, should be of 
less importance. If acts or omissions committed by PA are attributable to Israel, the 
state is responsible for the authority’s human rights breaches no matter if those are 
committed inside or outside of Israel’s jurisdiction. 
 
The interpretation of human rights law in relation to non-state actors through the lens 
of the Draft Articles has been advocated by such writers as Hessbruegge.63 
Klint A. Cowan, for example, using ILC’s scheme in order to determine a state’s 
human rights responsibility for the conduct of autonomous entities to which it de jure 
has mandated power but in practice has very little control over. He explores the 
United States’ human rights responsibility for the conduct of American Indian 
Tribes.64 
Meanwhile, reading human rights responsibility through the lens of the 
aforementioned articles has been criticised by proponents of a less state-centred 
view. Clapham argues that the human rights treaties contain lex specialis rules for 
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62 HRC General Comment 31 para. 10 
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state attribution and the Draft Articles therefore don’t apply.65 Others have criticized 
the articles for being “inadequate” and even “flawed”, not taking “sufficient account of the 
consequences of the breakdown of the traditional state system of the nineteenth century”66 
Benvenisti denounces Israeli human rights responsibility for PA acts by claiming that 
what matters is the de facto situation, and not the de jure one. He does not provide 
any ground for this argument. If we look at the matter from the perspective of the ICJ 
articles, it appears clear that either a de facto, or a de jure, control, in itself, by a state 
over an entity such as the PA would make the acts of the latter attributable to the 
former. Benvenisti could then be placed in the category of scholars denouncing the 
full applicability of the rules of attribution to IHRL. Crawford seems to take a similar 
stand67 
The task ahead of us will then be to analyze the Israel-PA nexus according to articles 
4, 5 and 8 (whether PA is an Israeli “state organ”, “an entity empowered by the law of 
[Israel] to exercise elements of the governmental authority” or as a “group of persons 
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, [Israel] in 
carrying out the conduct.”). Article 7 will not need any specific consideration, but is 
merely clarifying the threshold of state responsibility under articles 4 and 5. 
 
4.1.2 PA as a “state organ” 
Art. 4 clearly spells out that the act of any state organ is attributable to the state and 
further specifies that an entity is a state organ if it is given that status in the domestic 
law of the state.  
 
It is questionable whether the referral uniquely to the “internal law” of a state is 
imperative. The Commentaries gives the reason for this wording, namely that the 
relation between a state and a sub-state body rarely is specified in international law. 
In that respect PA is an exception. The de jure nexus between PA and Israel is 
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regulated in the agreements of the Oslo Accords. Since Israel is a monistic legal 
system68, these instruments, can’t be regarded as Israeli domestic law per se. 
Reading this article in the light of the Commentaries it seems as in our case the 
agreements between PLO and Israel are a relevant legal source in this respect. It 
would also seem unreasonable to refer to domestic law only, when the relation is 
strictly regulated in international agreements. 
Moreover, the Oslo Accords, however ignored and circumvented by both parties, is 
the valid legal source for the interim framework, until new agreements have been 
signed.69 
The Interim agreement has likewise in part been implemented into domestic Israeli 
law.70 
In the Preamble to the Interim Agreement, as well as in DoP art. 1, the “aim” of the 
negotiations is articulated as the establishment of a “Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority”. 
There is however nothing in the Oslo accords, that clearly defines the status of PA. 
There is with other words nothing in this text that supports an unambiguous definition 
of PA as a “state organ”. 
The question that arises is if, for the purpose of state attribution, an “Interim Self-
Government Authority” can be read as a “state organ”, taking into account that its 
power and responsibilities are exclusively transferred from the state to which its 
internationally wrongful acts may be attributed. 
It is acknowledged that due to differences between states in language use, as well 
societal structure, a body may not be defined as a “state organ”, or not be subject to 
any legal definition at all, even though it in practice holds that function. So in cases 
                                                            
68 HRC, CCPR/C/ISR/3, 3rd periodic report of States parties (2007) art. 2 at  6 
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where an entity is not legally presented as a state organ one must determine whether 
the role of the entity in question can be characterized as one of a “state organ”.71 
“The reasons for this position are reinforced by the fact that federal States vary widely in their 
structure and distribution of powers, and that in most cases the constituent units have no 
separate international legal personality of their own”72 
 
We will then turn our focus to the de jure role of PA, and determine whether the 
relationship between Israel and PA is of a kind that would characterize PA a “state 
organ”. 
The Commentaries outlines a broad and inclusive definition of a state organ: 
“the reference to a State organ in article 4 is intended in the most general sense. It is not 
limited to the organs of the central government, to officials at a high level or to persons with 
responsibility for the external relations of the State. It extends to organs of government of 
whatever kind or classification, exercising whatever functions, and at whatever level in the 
hierarchy, including those at provincial or even local level.”73 
 
The Commentaries further specify the territorial scope of art 4 by holding that: 
“It does not matter for this purpose whether the territorial unit in question is a component unit 
of a federal State or a specific autonomous area, and it is equally irrelevant whether the 
internal law of the State in question gives the federal parliament power to compel the 
component unit to abide by the State’s international obligations.”74 
 
The Heirs of the Duc de Guise case is an often referred-to confirmation of this 
principle where it was held that the state of Italy was responsible for the actions of 
Sicily, even though the island constituted an autonomous regime.75 
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In our case this implies that PA’s autonomy and Israel’s degree of direct control over 
the entity is of less importance. There is little reason to regard PA as any different 
from for example the autonomous area of Sicily, treated like a state organ in the 
Heirs of the Duc de la Guise case, and whose acts and omissions were held 
attributable to the state of Italy. 
  
To the facts 
The limitations of this essay do not permit an exhaustive analysis of the Israel-PA 
nexus. I will let a few major examples illustrate my argument. 
PA is in many respects the outcome of a compromise between the two diametrically 
opposed interests of PLO and Israel. The character of the entity will accordingly be 
ambiguous. The incentives of both sides have been thoroughly analysed. For the 
PLO an “institutional solution” to the struggle for Palestinian self-determination, 
eventually a sovereign state, alongside the absentee PLO leadership’s own power 
interest has been observed as leading interests.76 
For Israel, security considerations and the unwillingness to remain responsible for the 
non-Israeli population in oPt have been put forth as important factors.77 
The terms of transition mandated PA to guarantee Israel’s security. As an illustration 
of this, Rabin’s statement prior to the signing of DoP, may serve: 
“I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza strip. The 
Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the 
Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights from criticizing the 
conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, 
and this is most important, the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do.”78 
Considering the inherent conflict between freedoms enlisted in human rights treaties 
and national security, it should come as no surprise to anyone that certain of Israel’s 
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human rights issues in oPt were to be transferred to PA as the institution overtook 
aspects of Israel’s security enforcement in oPt. Rabin’s statement above effectively 
illustrates this. 
Palestinian political factions, opposing the Oslo framework, have often publicly 
described PA as a tool for indirect Israeli rule.79 This is obviously a question of 
rhetoric and partly a means of de-legitimization, and in the words of an ICHR 
employee, “a very political issue”80. The PA political elite has meanwhile supported 
the image of PA as an independent state. We should bear in mind that, when 
assessing PA’s relation to Israel, we are entering very contested ground within the 
Palestinian discourse.     
It seems PA shares the role of undertaking elements of Israeli authority, serving 
Israeli interests in the occupied West Bank, as well as pursuing its own goals, 
related, among others, to the goal of an independent Palestinian state. 
The powers of PA are specified in the instruments of the Oslo Accords. These 
powers are strictly limited territorially and functionally. 
Territorially, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were divided into three different areas 
“Area A”, ”Area B” and ”Area C”. In the first, made up of core urban areas of the West 
Bank, power over internal security as well as civil matters are under complete control 
of PA. Area B, constituting hamlets and villages surrounding these areas, is under 
shared responsibility, where PA takes care of civil matters and security is shared by 
Israel and PA. Israel has an “overriding responsibility” for public order. Area C, the 
rest of the West Bank, is still under complete Israeli control.81 The city of Hebron 
follows a specific pattern, being divided into “H1” (= Area A) and “H2” (= Area C).82 
 
The unique source of PA’s authority is clearly specified as being Israel, and not the 
Palestinian population in oPt; 
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“Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this 
Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.”83 
 
This has also been observed by others.84 As Raja Shehadeh notes, this was a 
transfer of powers and responsibilities held exclusively by the Israeli government, 
from 1967 by the military, and from 1981 onwards partly by an Israeli civil 
administration.85 
The article continues 
 “Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred” 
This further highlights that Israel retains all authorities not transferred. The authorities 
of PA are strictly limited and thoroughly précised through the various instruments of 
the Oslo Accords. 
The status of PA is further domestically regulated through an Israeli military order 
transferring power to the Palestinian Authority.86 Accordingly the ultimate 
responsibility over PA is held by Israel who has the power to change the authority of 
PA as well as to dismantle it. 
PA is strictly limited in its ability to enter into foreign relations: 
the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, 
which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other 
types of foreign missions […]87 
This emphasizes the local governance character of PA. It is further enhanced by the 
fact that PA is given jurisdiction over Palestinians and other non-Israelis in the 
                                                            
83 IA  art. 1 
84 Shehadeh (1997), The Arab‐Israeli Accords (1996) pp50‐53 
85 Ibid. p34 
86 Benvenisti (2010) 
87 IA  art. 9(5) 
  26
territory under its authority, while Israel retains jurisdiction over Israelis, even when 
present in area A or B88. Dajani interprets this as if “PA governs a population, rather than a 
territory”89. 
Tax issues are regulated in the Protocol on Economic Relations (Annex VI to the 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement). PA is being granted the authority to levy taxes from the 
population in oPt, while Israel remains in control of collecting VAT and customs, and 
transfers the collected money to PA90. This fiscal relationship further supports the 
image of PA as a state organ, dependent on the central government for securing part 
of its financial base. 
Israel, through the Oslo process agreements, transferred aspects of its civil 
administration over the Palestinians living in oPt, for example social welfare91 
agriculture92,Forests93, Education and culture94, Health95 etc. These, according to the 
agreement, are to be completely under the authority of PA. 
The creation of a Palestinian security apparatus was another important aspect of the 
Oslo process, with the double role of providing for “internal” public order in oPt and 
safeguarding the security of Israel-proper.96 
Moreover, the A areas, over which the highest degree of authority has been 
transferred to PA, are completely separated from each other by area C, remaining 
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under Israeli authority, creating “islands” of PA control in a “sea” of Israeli rule, which 
further enhances the local character of PA authority.97 
With the words of Dajani “The sphere of authority transferred to the PA, therefore, are primarily 
municipal functions”98 
It could further be argued that these civil functions are responsibilities that Israel have 
qua belligerent occupier of the whole of oPt, through the Oslo Accords “outsourced” 
to PA. 
With this limited authority of PA in mind, Israel as the unique source of authority, and 
the fact that PA provide for security and civil matters under the responsibility of Israel, 
there is little room for considering PA anything beyond an autonomous region in the 
same way as for example Sicily, treated in the Duc de la Guise case. There are then 
good arguments, to regard PA as a “state organ” of Israel, within the meaning of the 
Draft Articles. 
 
4.1.3 PA as an “entity exercising elements of governmental authority” 
To determine whether PA is an “entity exercising elements of governmental authority” 
is a likewise delicate task and to some extent depending on the particular context, as 
expressed with the words of the Commentaries: 
“Beyond a certain limit, what is regarded as ‘governmental’ depends on the particular society, 
its history and traditions. Of particular importance will be not just the content of the powers, but 
the way they are conferred on an entity, the purposes for which they are to be exercised and 
the extent to which the entity is accountable to government for their exercise.”99 
However 
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“an entity is covered even if its exercise of authority involves an independent discretion or 
power to act; there is no need to show that the conduct was in fact carried out under the 
control of the State.”100 
 
It is, nevertheless, closely related to the question of being a “state organ”. I will 
therefore mostly draw on the above discussion.  
I have demonstrated that PA has been delegated powers by Israel partly to provide 
for Israeli security, as well as to undertake a broad array of municipal civil activities in 
areas of oPt, for a population under the overall responsibility of Israel.   
The vision of an authority providing for Israeli security has partly been realized, with a 
Palestinian security apparatus effectively cracking down on elements in the oPt 
constituting a security threat against Israel.101 
This fact further nourishes the view that PA (or at least its security apparatus) “is 
empowered by the law of [Israel] to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority”102 
The commentary stipulates further: 
 
“If it is to be regarded as an act of the State for purposes of international responsibility, the 
conduct of an entity must accordingly concern governmental activity and not other private or 
commercial activity in which the entity may engage.”103 
 
The question then arises, should PA human rights abuses committed while serving 
the interests of Israel, be separated from those committed in the interests of their 
own? Should PA, for the purpose of determining human rights obligations, be treated 
as “empowered [..] to exercise elements of the governmental authority” in the 
instances that they actually pursue Israel’s interests, and as non-attributable to Israel 
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when it, in fact, doesn’t?” In practice interests are, of course, intermingled and such a 
separation would be impossible. 
 
“The extent to which the entity is accountable to government for their exercise”104 is 
mentioned as an important aspect to consider. There is no formal system of PA 
accountability before Israel on issues concerning human rights breaches of 
Palestinian citizens. PA, in Israeli domestic courts has been given sovereignty.105 
Israel has however made use of coercive means of policy enforcement on PA, such 
as detention of MPs, destruction of PA institutions during the al-Aqsa Intifada, 
withholding of tax revenues etc.106 To the extent that these acts have been 
committed with the purpose of ensuring a certain PA policy, it has been for other 
reasons, such as relating to PA’s failure, or unwillingness, to provide for Israel’s 
security.107 
When looking specifically at the question of PA human rights compliance vis-à-vis 
Palestinian citizens, PA is hence not accountable to the government of Israel at all. 
However, Israel disposes of several coercive means to enforce specific PA policies, 
wherein human rights compliance could in theory take part. 
In conclusion, then, if the arguments for considering PA a “state organ” were to be 
dismissed, it seems as there are good grounds to consider PA, in part, and in certain 
instances, to be “empowered by the law of [Israel] to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority”. It is clear that not all PA activity would be covered under this 
article, but when, for example, acting in order to provide for Israeli security. 
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4.1.4 PA as a “group of persons under the direct control” of Israel 
The commentary to the ILC Draft Articles proposes the test provided by the 
Nicaragua and Tadić cases in order to determine whether a person is “under the 
direction or control” of a state, but conclude that “it is a matter for appreciation in 
each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of 
a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it.” 
The analysis of PA under this article is highly linked to the treatment of PA as a de 
facto regime, which is thoroughly dealt with infra. At this point it will be sufficient to 
conclude that it appears obvious that PA, in general, acts with a degree of 
independence, vis-à-vis the state of Israel, by far superseding any threshold of 
“direction or control”.  As Benvenisti points out, Israel has little direct control over PA, 
even though this is stipulated in the Oslo agreements.108 This question, furthermore, 
has to be treated on a case-to-case basis, which makes a general assessment 
difficult and even superfluous. 
 
4.2 Israeli diagonal responsibility 
A second way of addressing the human rights responsibility for PA conduct is by 
considering PA a private actor on territory over which Israel has jurisdiction. Israel 
has a due diligence responsibility to protect individuals subject to its jurisdiction from 
actions committed by third parties amounting to human rights violations.109 
 
4.2.1 Legal base 
ICCPR 2(1) obliges state parties to “respect and to ensure” the rights included in the 
Covenant. The wording implies positive obligations to protect persons under its 
jurisdiction. General Comment 31 has further underlined the obligation to protect  
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“against acts committed by private persons or entities that  would impair the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights”110 
ICESCR has in the same manner been interpreted by the CESCR to imply diagonal 
obligations.111 
CEDAW and ICERD both contain due diligence obligations expressed in more 
specific language. CEDAW has it that the State Parties must: 
“take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organisation or enterprise”112 
ICERD 1(d) imposes an obligation on states to:  
“prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by 
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization”. 
CRC provides a duty to: 
“respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention”113 
 
4.2.2 Applicability on our present case 
Zegveld provides an analysis of several authoritative international judgements 
relating to whether states have a responsibility to act in due diligence to ensure the 
human rights compliance of armed opposition groups. She comes to the conclusion 
that: 
“International practice demonstrates that the general obligation resting on the state 
under human rights treaties to ‘ensure’ or ‘secure’ the relevant rights and freedoms 
entails the obligation to protect individuals from armed opposition groups on its territory. 
[…] an internal conflict in itself […] does not remove the state’s positive obligations 
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under human rights treaties to regulate and control the conduct of actors under its 
jurisdiction.”114 
 
As displayed by for example the Namibia case, a state’s responsibility under 
international law concerns the territory under its physical control, which implies an 
Israeli responsibility for oPt, to the extent it exercises its effective control over the 
territory.115 In a case against Uganda, the ICJ held that its due diligence 
responsibilities extended to the parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo that it was 
at the time occupying.116 
The question at this point is, then, if Israel’s lack of total control over the areas 
assigned to PA relieves it of the obligation to protect individuals from human rights 
abuses by the same PA. 
ECtHR, in a case brought before it, held that generally, lack of control does not totally 
cancel a state’s obligations to protect individuals from breaches of human rights 
committed by non-state actors. Specifically, Moldova 
“does not thereby cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention over that part of its territory temporarily subject to a local authority 
sustained by rebel forces or another State.”117 
And that the country further 
“must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign 
States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.”118 
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The signing of the San José Agreement between El Salvador and the armed 
opposition group FMLN in 1990, according to which the human rights responsibility 
for territory put under guerrilla control is to be divided between the two parties, 
provides case with strong parallels. In the view of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights,119 the international responsibility for human rights violations, however, 
remained fully upon the state, El Salvador. 
A similar situation, was the temporary transfer by Colombia of 44000 km2 of territory 
to the armed opposition group FARC in 1998, with the purpose of facilitating peace 
negotiations. Colombia withdrew police, army and the judiciary, in order to grant 
FARC with effective control over the area. Zegveld argues, in the light of the above 
considerations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that this transfer 
did not in any way relieve Colombia of its obligations under human rights treaties. 
This conclusion stems from the fact that Colombia deliberately transferred powers to 
FARC, that it in fact is not materially unable to protect individuals in the mentioned 
area, but made the voluntary choice to turn the responsibility over to the armed 
opposition group.120 
As a general rule, Zegveld points out that: 
“It would seem that the effect of the temporary impossibility of the operation of human 
rights treaties only occurs when the state’s further compliance is not possible, owing to 
forcible or involuntary loss of control of territory as a result of enemy action. When the 
state has contributed to the occurrence of loss of territorial control or otherwise to the 
ineffectiveness of the government, it would seem that its obligations under human rights 
treaties remain fully valid.”121 
 
This being said, it is remarkable that no treaty bodies, ICJ in the Wall advisory 
opinion or the authors of the Goldstone Report have raised the questions as to 
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whether Israel might have a due diligence responsibility over Palestinians in the 
areas of oPt that have been transferred to PA. This fact could suggest a different 
stand on the question than the Inter-American Commission, or possibly a 
development of the law. 
As accounted for, Israel gave, through the Oslo process, willingly up parts of the 
territory occupied by it, to the newly created institution of PA, for this purpose 
comparable to an armed opposition group. No physical obstacles keep Israel from 
reoccupying these areas and re-establishing its direct and total authority here (which 
in fact occurred during the partial reoccupation in 2000 and the almost complete 
reoccupation in 2002)122. The clauses in IA and Wye River Memorandum123 obliging 
the PLO to respect international standards of human rights, similarly to the one in the 
San José Agreement, would not relieve Israel of its human rights obligations for oPt. 
The human rights protection provided by this approach is in some respects weaker 
than, the regime provided by the attribution approach. A state is only responsible for 
enforcing compliance of armed opposition groups, when concerned with grave 
breaches of human rights. The protection of life would be included in this category, 
while for example ill-treatment in detention falls outside of it.124 
This limited lack of State responsibility leads Zegveld to propose shared 
responsibility, in similar situations, between the state and the non-State actor.125 
Israel would then be responsible for “grave breaches” of human rights, while PA 
would remain responsible for less serious breaches. How such a division would look 
in practice, and how an enforcement mechanism would appear, remains however 
diffuse. 
It seems in any case that there are strong arguments behind a claim that Israel has, 
at least a limited, responsibility to act in due diligence, to protect individuals from PA 
acts in oPt amounting to breaches of human rights. 
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5 PA as a de facto regime with human rights responsibilities 
I have considered, above, the vertical and diagonal responsibility for PA acts and 
omissions. If we were to dismiss the arguments supra about Israeli responsibility for 
PA’s acts and omissions, the arising question is: Does PA have a horizontal 
obligation under IHRL? 
The question whether non-state actors in general, and de facto governments in 
particular, themselves have obligations under international human rights law, is a 
highly debated one. Two recent books126 focusing solely on non-state actors and 
human rights have developed the theory. 
 
5.1 Legal base 
Human rights treaty law does not create binding rules applicable to non-state actors. 
The major human rights conventions refer explicitly and unambiguously to the “state 
parties”. 
This has further been highlighted by, for example, HRC, in 2004, holding that: 
“The article 2, paragraph 1, obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, 
have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law.”127 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is more ambiguous. Two passages in the 
document allow for the argument that human rights could bind entities other than 
states:  
“Every individual and every organ of society […] shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and […] to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance […]”128 
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The declaration further spells out that the individual has 
“duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible”129 
The fact that important parts of the UDHR have reached the status of customary 
international law130 opens up for an application of these customary principles to de 
facto regimes. 
During the war in former Yugoslavia, for example, one member of the Human Rights 
Committee, in 1992, took the stand that the Bosnian Serb authority, which exercised 
control over territory, was bound by IHRL, due to its territorial control.131 
 
Security Council Resolutions  
In 1998 the UN Security Council in a resolution requested 
“the Afghan factions to put an end to the discrimination against girls and women and to other 
violations of human rights […] and to adhere to the internationally accepted norms and 
standards in this sphere”132 
 
Human Rights Commission/Council Reports 
Bodies, such as the Human Rights Council have expressed, in vague language, a 
desire that de facto regimes respect human rights. During the civil war in Somalia the 
Human Rights Commission encouraged “all parties” to “respect human rights”133. This was 
followed up in 2006, following the war between Israel and the Lebanese armed group 
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Hezbollah, when the Human Rights Commission issued a report where it is spelled 
out that: 
“Although Hezbollah, a non-State actor, cannot become a party to these human rights treaties, 
it remains subject to the demand of the international community, first expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society respect and promote 
human rights. The Security Council has long called upon various groups which Member States 
do not recognize as having the capacity to do so to formally assume international obligations 
to respect human rights. It is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to 
respect human rights norms when it exercises significant control over territory and population 
and has an identifiable political structure”.134 
 
In the 2009 Goldstone Report it is spelled out that: 
“In the context of the matter within the Mission’s mandate, it is clear that non-State 
actors that exercise government-like functions over a territory have a duty to respect 
human rights”135 
It is not, however, spelled out which specific rights constitute these “human rights”, 
neither are the legal sources for these duties. The report refers mainly to unilateral 
undertakings as well as domestic Palestinian law: 
“The Mission notes that the Palestinian Authority, through its public undertakings as 
well as those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, has declared its commitment to respect international human rights 
law in several instances, including in the context of international agreements. This 
commitment is also contained in the Palestinian Basic Law.”136 
This passage refers only to “legal sources” of a non-binding character.137 One may 
pose the question why there is no referral to principles of customary international law 
or to jus cogens, possibly binding non-state actors like PA as “hard law”. This 
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omission must be seen an unwillingness to spell out that similar entities are really 
bound by IHRL, and an attempt to rather holding them morally responsible.   
The referral to internal law as well as undertakings of a morally, rather than legally, 
binding nature suggests that these “duties” stem from “soft”, rather than “hard” law. 
There is little indicating that these entities are legally bound by IHRL. 
 
Secondary Literature 
Literature covering human rights compliance of Non-state actors have largely been 
focusing on TNCs, international peace-keeping operations, NGOs, International 
organizations and armed groups.138 PA, approached as a non-state actor, falls 
somewhat outside of this framework. It is obviously not a TNC, IO, peacekeeping 
mission or NGO. A natural category to put it would be an armed group exercising 
effective power over a certain territory. PA disposes over an (armed) police- and 
security force and, as we have seen, exercises elements of effective control over 
some territory. But the PA is at one time more and less than an armed group in 
effective control. It is less, since the limits to its authority, or effective control, are 
defined by law and temporarily granted by Israel, the central government. The source 
of PA’s authority is not its physical control, but the wilful granting of authority by 
Israel. PA is more than most armed groups due to the sophistication of its power 
apparatus, in many respects closely resembling that of a state. It has a functioning 
legislature, judiciary and executive administration, its own police and security forces, 
prisons, mandate and capacity to issue official travel documents etc. 
The question of whether an organization such as PA could have obligations under 
IHRL, then, remains unsettled to begin with. Second It seems to be a consensual 
understanding that if such obligations exist, they only do so to the extent the 
organization (armed group) has established authority over a territory. With the words 
of Zegveld  
“A relevant criterion to determine whether armed opposition groups can incur 
accountability under human rights law may therefore be the existence of an authority 
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effectively controlling territory and persons […] The threshold for the applicability of 
human rights standards should therefore be higher than the threshold for applicability of 
international humanitarian law”139 
 
In conclusion there seem to be “emerging”140 human rights obligations for de facto 
regimes, however questioned. As seen, if such obligations exist, they seem to 
presuppose some level of territorial control.  
 
5.2 A non-state with state-like responsibilities 
A first question will then be to determine the test for effective control, and then 
analyze whether PA is in possession of such control. 
  
5.2.1 A Test for Effective Control 
Human rights apply to areas and persons under the “jurisdiction” of the contracting 
state: “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”141, “in territories under their 
jurisdiction.”142,  “in any territory under its jurisdiction.”143, The meaning of “jurisdiction” for the 
purpose of these conventions has been subject to a major debate, but is generally 
understood, with the support of various court cases, as meaning effective territorial 
control. HRC for example has declared that 
“[a] state party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the covenant to anyone within 
the power or effective control of that state Party, even if not situated within the territory of the 
state party”144 
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ECtHR has set the bar high. In Banković et al v. Belgium, the court held that the 
threshold for “jurisdiction” is high and effective control can be defined as the capacity 
to ensure the entire scope of rights provided in the ECHR145 
This test seems however to have evolved with the Ilaşcu case, where the threshold is 
set to “effective authority”.146 
Meanwhile the HRC seems to apply a much more inclusive test. In the Lopez Burgos 
case, relating to the treatment by Uruguay of one of its citizens abroad, it was held 
that 
“The reference in article 1 of the Optional Protocol to ‘individuals subject to its jurisdiction’ […] 
is not to the place where the violation occurred, but rather  to the relationship between the 
individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, 
wherever they occurred”147 
This test is preferable for a number of reasons. First of all it is applied in relation to 
the international instrument of ICCPR, binding in the region, and develops the 
meaning of “jurisdiction” in the covenant. Second this test seems far more fit to apply 
to a de facto regime. 
If we accept this test, it should already be clear that such a relationship exists 
between PA and its subjects. PA is, within certain functional limitations, and to a 
varying extent in different geographical areas, exercising authority establishing a 
state-like relationship to the Palestinians living therein. 
 PA’s disposes of  a legislative body, a one-chamber parliament consisting of 132 
members. There is further a judiciary and various executive branches consisting of 
25 ministries.148 It disposes of its own police, security force, secret service, prisons, 
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education system, health service etc149. It issues travel documents and employs 
approximately 150,000 civil servants.150  
As such PA resembles prima facie a state, at least what concerns its relationship to 
the population living under its jurisdiction. 
With HRC’s argumentation above, it is clear that whether PA human rights abuses 
occur in Area A, B, C, H1 or H2 is of less interest. To the extent PA is the direct 
perpetrator, it should be responsible. Even when they occur in areas where 
responsibility is shared with Israel, the relationship government-governed seems to 
be present. With the words of a Palestinian human rights officer “it is as if we have 
two governments”.151 
The functional limitations imposed on PA’s authority, however, merit some further 
consideration. 
 
5.3 Limitations to PA control 
In the following chapter I will consider the limitations to PA’s authority, to try to define 
PA effective control in the negative. 
 
5.3.1 Israeli detentions of, and travel restrictions on, PLC members and civil 
servants 
One issue raising serious questions about the degree of de facto control of PA is the 
ongoing Israeli policy of detaining members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, 
Ministers and senior civil servants. This practice was, among other things, 
commented on in the Goldstone Report 
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“The detention of members of the Legislative Council has meant that it has been unable to 
function and exercise its legislative and oversight function over the Palestinian executive.”152 
“The arrest by Israel of members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and other Palestinian 
Authority officials has also resulted in the inability of many institutions to function properly and 
prevented Palestinians from the two areas to work together.”153 
 
The detention of the Council’s members has meant that it has been unable to 
function for three years and no laws have been passed. According to ICHR, it has not 
been able to exercise its oversight function over the Government’s administrative and 
financial performance 
“In other words, the goal is the deconstruction of both the Palestinian political system and the 
Legislative Council as can be inferred from the detention of almost two thirds of the PLC 
deputies. The natural outcome is reflected in the ongoing obstruction of PLC functions and 
roles, both in terms of legislation and oversight of the executive, and inevitably, the indirect 
obstruction of the main legal instruments such as Palestinian Basic Law and the PLC 
bylaws.”154 
And further that 
“Israel maintained control over the PNA by influencing the PNA’s ability to keep its official 
institutions ensuring human and citizens rights operational at a time when the PNA had no 
sovereign control over major natural and other sources such as land, water, regional 
continuity, and total jurisdiction for the legal and administrative systems of its people, free 
access to the external markets and freedom of movement.”155 
 
It is evident that this to a certain extent curtails PA’s ability to protect rights 
diagonally, as they lack the capacity to formally protect rights by legislation. 
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5.3.2 Israeli Travel restrictions 
Israeli has since 1996 imposed travel restrictions on the West Bank156 affecting 
members of the Palestinian Legislative Council’s (and other Palestinian’s) ability to 
move freely has further negatively affected PA’s ability to exercise authority over the 
area, and as a consequence to ensure human rights. 
 
5.3.3 Control over water facilities 
Another area of control, which only to a very limited extent has been transferred to 
PA, is the control over natural resources, there among water. According to a recent 
AI report: 
 “Under the Oslo Accords, the PA was given no authority to make decisions relating to drilling 
of new wells, or upgrading existing wells, or implementing other water-related projects, and 
Israel continues to control decision-making regarding the amount of water that may be 
extracted from existing wells and springs in the OPT virtually to the same extent as it did 
before the Oslo Accords. Thus, the Israeli authorities continue to monitor and control the 
amount of water extracted from Palestinian wells and springs in the West Bank, and 
Palestinians are not allowed to drill new wells or rehabilitate existing wells without first 
obtaining authorization from the Israeli authorities. Such authorization is rarely granted; even 
when it is, the process is an unduly lengthy and complicated one and the potential for delays 
and consequent cost increases is high.”157 
This is of course a limitation with negative implications for the capacity of PA to 
ensure human rights to individuals in the area of its control. 
 
5.3.4 Tax Collection 
The fiscal system, partly remaining in the control of Israel, has briefly been accounted 
for supra. VAT collection on imports to oPt are collected by Israel and the revenues 
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transferred by Israel to PA. The same system applies to income tax on Palestinian 
workers employed inside Israel.158  
These tax revenue transfers to PA have been halted by Israel at numerous instances 
as a means of political pressure. One of the cut, after Hamas’ election victory in 
2006, lasted for more than a year159 whereby Israel withheld US $50-60 million of tax 
revenues per month.160 In 2008 as a response to PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s 
political campaign, directed towards EU, criticizing settlement expansion, a similar 
move was made, withholding $75.161 
This, in theory and in practice, further limits PA’s capacity to manage its civil 
administration, and in the extension, its ability to ensure human rights protection. 
 
5.3.5 Indirect effects of Israeli policy 
Israeli policy in relation to the oPt, further has indirect consequences on the human 
rights record in the oPt. One example often referred to is the high level of domestic 
violence against women, due to the frustration and disempowerment among men 
caused by travel restrictions and the high level of unemployment caused thereof.162 
This further displays how intertwined the human rights record in oPt is with the 
occupation policy of the Israeli government, even in thematic and geographic areas 
seemingly outside the control of Israel. 
 
5.3.6 A shared responsibility? 
It should be clear, then, that PA does not in effect exercise unlimited “jurisdiction”, 
even in Area A. The “coordination of policies”163 provided for in the DoP might not 
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have been effectuated, but rather a coercive Israeli attitude on issues related to its 
own security and political gains. The question relevant for this task is whether these 
restrictions on PA control have adversely affected the authority’s ability to ensure 
human rights. 
The situation of almost total Israeli control in areas C, shared control with Israel in 
areas B and a varying degree of indirect Israeli control in all of these areas makes it 
very difficult to make a general assessment of PA’s effective control and might have 
to be considered on a case-to-case basis.164 For the many grave breaches, for 
example torture, arbitrary detention, extra-legal killings etc, committed by for example 
Palestinian security officers, there is a direct and uninterrupted link between the 
government and the governed, satisfying HRC’s test, clearly triggering PA 
responsibility. The indirect Israeli control however, in some instances questin the 
degree to which PA could be deemed responsible. 
 
I will try to illustrate this with three hypothetic scenarios, all occurring in area A of the 
West Bank: (1) Palestinian Security Forces165 detain and torture an individual due to 
his political opposition towards the PLO. (2) Discriminatory Palestinian laws against 
women. (3) IDF enters area A and raids a Palestinian urban area in the search for 
wanted people, while rounding them up, one of them is severely beaten. 
They are all clear breaches of human rights: 2) Right to freedom from torture, right to 
freedom from arbitrary detention etc, 2) Right to freedom from discrimination 3) Right 
to freedom from inhuman treatment. 
The question is who is responsible in each of these cases. In the first example, it 
should be obvious that PA is responsible. The Palestinian Security Forces are 
Palestinian “government” officials, act in their official capacity, and are under 
unlimited control of the PA. As already noted, the relationship government-governed 
exists. The third case should be equally clear. IDF represent the Israeli government 
and human rights treaties, as we have seen, apply extraterritorially. Israel is 
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responsible. In the second case, the situation is more complicated. PA has failed to 
legislate in order to overcome discrimination against women. On the other hand, this 
thematic area (legislation) is a field where PA control has been severely restricted, 
due inter alia to Israeli policy of MP detention. In this case then, one could argue that 
PA does not in fact exercises effective control over the relevant thematic field. One 
could argue, then, that PA does not quite exercise unlimited authority in the relevant 
functional field. 
Clapham notes that de facto regimes rarely dispose of a refined administration, 
capable of ensuring the full spectre of human rights. What Clapham proposes, as an 
analogy from the clause in ICESCR, is that the obligations should be considered “to 
the maximum of its [the PA’s] available resources”. 166 This seems highly relevant 
and applicable to the present case. The reporting of for example ICHR, where Israeli 
policy’s limiting effect on PA human rights performance is explicitly reported on 
167seems implicitly be based on such an approach. 
To the extent that these limitations to PA authority do not create a corresponding 
effective control of Israel’s, for example limited PA control over its legislative and 
executive, the question arises if this would put the responsibility on Israel, due to its 
overall occupation, or it simply creates a human rights limbo, where nobody has the 
responsibility. 
The ICJ, in its 2004 “Wall” Advisory Opinion, held that Israel is 
“under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those 
fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities.”168 
This could in theory serve as guarantee that PA’s ability to ensure the human rights 
by which it is bound are not infringed. 
There is thus a degree of human rights responsibility in the West Bank according to 
the nature of the right breached. It is clear that no ultimate rule for the division of 
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human rights responsibility could be established. Israeli policy in relation to PA and 
oPt changes over time, PA changes, etc.  
 
5.3.7 Which human rights? 
While holding the view that PA is bound by customary norms of human rights, 
Benvenisti asks the question whether human rights conventions apply to an 
autonomous regime like PA, and, if so, which conventions do apply. 
He proposes three ways in which human rights can be applied in PA-land: (1) By 
simply considering instruments ratified by Israel applying to PA, through the transfer 
of authority to the latter. (2) By considering instruments ratified by Israel during the 
occupation period as part of the law of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. (3) By 
unilateral undertakings by PA to respect specific rights.169 
His first proposition is supported by HRC jurisprudence holding that Human rights 
treaties are “localized treaties”, that is to say, territorial, binding on a territory, and 
remaining in force in a territory whether coming under the jurisdiction of a power not 
itself having ratified human rights conventions.170 For example were human rights 
instrument ratified by Portugal during the period of its sovereignty over Macau still 
seen as binding on the Island after its return to China.171 Israel has signed and 
ratified the six major UN human rights conventions, CERD in 1979, as well as 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CRC and CEDAW in 1991. As these conventions have 
generally been held to apply to oPt (even though Israel denies it), these would all, 
consequently, be valid instruments of international law in oPt.172 
Benvenisti’s second proposition refers to internal law, and is of less interest to us as 
we are dealing with PA’s international responsibility. 
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The author’s third proposition has, as we will see173, largely been undertaken by PA 
in a number of ways, since the time of Benvenisti’s writing. The remaining question is 
whether these undertakings are binding upon PA. This will be the focus of the next 
chapter. 
It has further been proposed that de facto regimes are bound by CIL.174 If we accept 
this, these rules would also apply to PA. 
 
5.4 Unilateral Undertakings 
An often repeated “source” of PA’s human rights responsibilities is the unilateral 
undertakings to respect human rights and “endorsements” of human rights 
instruments.  
PLO and PA representatives have at several instances undertaken to respect 
international human rights standards. 
Two important general questions arise as we analyze these commitments: 1) What is 
meant by “human rights” when (as often is the case) the range of rights is not 
specified? 2) Do these commitments have any legally binding effect? 
As an answer to the first question, we can refer to one study which has shown that 
declarations, agreements, codes of custom etc. that commit non-state actors (armed 
groups in conflict situations) to “human rights” refer to human rights provided by 
CIL.175 There is no reason to believe that PA, notwithstanding its specific character in 
comparison to armed groups, would be any different in this respect. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe the meaning of “human rights”, “internationally-accepted norms 
and principles of human rights” etc, have the connotation of customary international 
human rights law. Meanwhile, PA commitments have extended far beyond CIL by for 
example “endorsing” CEDAW. Our earlier conclusions on the territoriality of human 
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rights conventions also open up for the argument that all human rights conventions 
ratified by Israel apply to the West Bank as a territory, and therefore bind PA. 
As an answer to the second question I will analyze each undertaking separately. 
 
5.4.1 The Barcelona Declaration 
Yasir Arafat in 1995 signed the Barcelona Declaration, setting up principles for the 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation going under the name “the Barcelona Process”. In 
doing so he undertook  
“in the […] declaration of principles to: act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international 
law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are 
party”176 
This signature has often been evoked by human rights defenders, local and 
international, to hold the PA responsible under IHRL.177 The question we must 
answer to here, then, is to what extent the signing of this declaration can be said to 
have a legally binding effect on PA. 
Declarations of this kind belong to what is commonly named “soft law”, setting 
standards that in the long run may achieve the status of customary international law. 
In itself, however, the signing of such a declaration does not legally bind the 
signatories.178 
So, the Barcelona Declaration is of a non-legally binding character179, a “politically 
enforceable instrument […] but […] not binding in law.”180 The signing of such a declaration 
may arguably impose a moral obligation on a signatory, and constitute a promise to 
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its citizens against which its actions can be judged, but does not give rise to 
obligations under international treaty law. 
 
5.4.2 Public Announcements 
Another unilateral undertaking that has been suggested as putting a human rights 
responsibility on the shoulders of PA is Arafat’s and later Mahmud Abbas’ public 
announcements to unilaterally undertake to respect human rights principles.181 
For example former PA president Yasser Arafat on several occasions declared that 
PA was committed to respecting “all human rights standards”182  
 
A more recent and specific example is Women’s day (8th March) 2009, ehen 
Mahmoud Abbas issued Presidential Decree number 19 unilaterally “ratifying” 
CEDAW and thus considers itself bound by it.183 
This is another example of an act arguably establishing a moral responsibility to 
respect human rights standards, but does, needless to say, in no way have a legally 
binding effect.184 
 
5.4.3 The Palestinian Basic Law 
The Basic Law, functioning as a proto-constitution of PA contains several substantial 
human rights clauses, which are also frequently referred to as a base for holding PA 
responsible185. On top of this, art 10 stipulates that: 
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“1 Basic human rights and liberties shall be protected and respected. 2 The Palestinian 
National Authority shall work without delay to become a party to regional and international 
declarations and covenants that protect human rights.”186 
 
The Palestinian Basic Law is a domestic instrument that doesn’t give rise to any 
international obligations. It does, however, bind PA under domestic law to respect 
human rights standards, which may have a positive effect on PA’s human rights 
compliance and create a domestic system of accountability. 
   
5.4.4 Interim Agreement and Wye Memorandum River clause on respect for human 
rights 
A more delicate issue is the question of the legal implications of PLO’s signing of the 
IA, and thereby committing itself to art XIX of the agreement to respecting 
“internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights”.  
This is often mentioned by human rights promoters as creating human rights 
obligations for PA.187 Israel has likewise held that this clause ensures the applicability 
of human rights norms for the population in the PA-controlled parts of oPt (in relation 
to PA), while relieving Israel of its responsibility in these areas. Israel has further held 
that for practical reasons, it would be impossible to report on the human rights 
situation in these areas, as the government lacks the data.188 
Apart from these referrals, the Wall Advisory Opinion and Goldstone Report are silent 
on this matter. 
As mentioned, when signing the San José Agreement with the armed opposition 
group FMLN, El Salvador was held by the Inter-American Commission to not be 
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relieved of its international human rights obligations, but the Commission took the 
stand that the country remained bound by applicable human rights provisions in all of 
its territory, the responsibility thus remaining on EL-Salvador.189 
From this analogy, it seems then, as if these articles of the Oslo instruments would 
not relieve Israel of its international responsibility for human rights violations arising 
from acts committed by PA. 
 
5.4.5 Code of Conduct? 
In the literature covering human rights and non-state actors code of conduct is 
commonly referred to. Corporations, International Organizations, NGOs as well as 
armed groups190 are among those entities that have unilaterally undertaken to follow 
a set of norms, derived from international standards of human rights. These codes of 
conduct are, strictly speaking, not legally binding upon the actors but serve as moral 
frameworks against which the actions of the actors can be judged and could have the 
effect of increasing the human rights compliance of the entities endorsing them.191 In 
fact, empirical studies on similar undertakings by armed groups suggest that 
commitment to codes of conduct encourages these actors to respect human rights.192  
As a non-state actor incapable of entering into human rights treaties, the legal 
implication of PA making similar moves should be no different than that of other non-
state actors. This has no binding effect upon PA. Codes of conduct have, not 
surprisingly, been criticized for their weakness, lacking formal monitoring and/or 
enforcement procedures. However, they have created ethical frameworks giving rise 
to informal surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, or ‘extra-legal enforcers’ to 
use Reinisch’s words, such as consumers, donors, member states etc, exercising 
their economical power over the actors in order to “enforce” a higher level of human 
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rights compliance.193 These undertakings might furthermore be regarded as a 
confirmation of already existing obligations under customary international human 
rights law. 
 
5.5 Accountability for non-state actors 
Mainly, three potential ways for the accountability of non-state actors under 
international law exist; 1) International state responsibility for non-state acts, 2) Direct 
non-state responsibility under international law before international tribunals, 3) Direct 
human rights accountability before national courts.194 
The first and the third options have been dealt with supra (1) holding Israel 
accountable for PA acts, for example in their periodic reports to CAT and CCPR and 
3) holding PA officials accountable in Israeli (military) courts). What remains is the 
option of holding PA, as a non-state actor in effective control, accountable before an 
international tribunal, or other body. 
But international treaty-based bodies have been reluctant to directly address non-
states, without capacity to ratify conventions, and at its present state the international 
human rights system provides no possibilities for holding entities such as the PA 
responsible under IHRL. 
There is thus a discrepancy between an emerging recognition of non-state actors as 
bearers of obligations under human rights law and a lack of extension of the 
institutional and procedural framework to monitor and enforce such obligations. 
 
5.5.1 “Soft accountability” 
In the lack of mechanisms for legal accountability for human rights violations 
committed by non-state actors, extra-legal means have been presented as ways to 
ensure human rights compliance. This relates mainly to actors such as Transnational 
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Corporations (TNC), International Organizations (IO) and NGOs. Consumers’ 
boycotts, Withholding of government funding, withdrawal of membership etc are 
examples of “soft accountability” pressing for higher levels of human rights 
compliance.195  
As a general feature of the recent development of human rights in relation to non-
state actors, Reinich points to a diminished focus on whether human rights law is 
actually legally binding on the entity, when being enforced.196  
 
6 Summary 
In conclusion, there are broadly speaking three ways of arguing about the 
responsibility for human rights compliance in oPt today. The first two have been dealt 
with supra; According to the first, Israel still holds the full responsibility. The second 
line argues that PA as a de facto regime is responsible. Thirdly, one could argue that 
nobody is responsible. If we were to accept Israel’s arguments of the lack of effective 
control over PA-controlled areas, and meanwhile reject the view that de facto 
regimes have responsibilities under IHRL, oPt becomes a limbo, where human rights 
are breached without responsibility. 
From the third line it could, of course, further be argued that whether or not PA strictly 
speaking is bound by IHRL it has a moral obligation to respect human rights 
standards, reinforced by its own unilateral undertakings. 
As demonstrated, there are strong arguments to for holding Israel responsible for the 
human rights compliance of PA. It is then remarkable that this does not seem to have 
been considered by ICJ in the Wall case, in the Goldstone Report or by none of the 
treaty monitoring bodies, concentrating solely on Israeli direct human rights 
breaches. This might suggest a legal evolvement away from the strict state-centered 
approach. 
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Accept for the vague and ambiguous reference in the Goldstone Report, these 
sources are however likewise unclear whether PA in fact has legally binding 
obligations under IHRL. In fact, it seems uncertain whether IHRL as it stands today is 
capable of binding PA directly. 
If it does, the enforcement mechanism available are limited to “extra-legal” and 
”quasi-legal” means. 
This framework leads us to the next task that I have undertaken to deal with, the 
existing system for human rights protection in oPt, and how it deals with the question 
of responsibility. 
 
7 Protecting human rights in oPt 
I will now turn my attention to the system for human rights protection available in PA-
controlled areas of oPt. 
The system available for human rights “protection” can broadly be divided into the 
categories of 1) National institution for Human Rights (ICHR), 2) NGOs, 3) IOs (UN). 
  
7.1 Treaty Bodies 
The PA or PLO have not been accepted to sign any human rights treaties and are 
therefore presently not being monitored by any human rights treaty body. 
Since PA’s ‘endorsement’ of CEDAW they have requested to be allowed to submit 
periodic reports, but have not been accepted by the committee. However OHCHR 
have accepted these reports, as part of their monitoring activity. 197 
 
7.2 Special Rapporteur 
The post of Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights on the situation 
of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (Hereafter Special 
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Rapporteur) was established in 1993 as a special country-specific procedure under 
the Commission on Human Rights and later inherited by the Human Rights Council . 
The position is currently held by US professor emeritus Richard Falk. The mandate, 
however, is limited to covering “human rights violations committed by the occupying 
Power and not by the occupied people.” It therefore does “not consider the human 
rights record of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank” 198 
This limitation of the mandate has been criticized. For example AI in 2008 urged HRC 
to review the mandate and extend its scope to PA and other Palestinian actors as, in 
its present state, it “undercuts both the effectiveness and the credibility of the mandate.”199 
However, as it stands today, the special procedure does not cover human rights 
breaches of the PA. 
 
7.3 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
Originally set up 1996 as a consultancy body to the new PA, advising on human 
rights standards. However, reporting was not part of its mandate.200 
The mandate of OHCHR (oPt) was amended by a Human Rights Council Declaration 
in 2009. The mandate has now been extended to include reporting on the human 
rights compliance of the state of Israel, the Hamas de facto regime in the Gaza Strip 
as well as the Palestinian Authority. OHCHR (oPt) reports directly to the Human 
Rights Council.  
The agency considers PA to be bound by human rights within the domestic legal 
framework as well as morally through the authority’s unilateral undertakings. In the 
recently initiated reporting on PA, the High Commissioner reports on breaches of 
conventions unilaterally “endorsed” by PA, as if they were internationally binding the 
                                                            
198  UN Human Rights Council, Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories : report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 
(2008) p6 
199 Amnesty International (2008) 
200 Tomic (2010) 
  57
authority. This is however done while admitting that strictly legally speaking, these 
endorsements do not bind the PA.201 
Two aspects of the work, and development of, OHCHR in oPt  must be commented 
on. First, the inclusion of PA into the mandate of OHCHR can be understood within 
the framework of an increased coverage of non-State actors depicted by Reinisch, 
and Clapham. The Palestinian Authority is presently covered within the UN Charter-
based system for human rights monitoring, in a way comparable to a sovereign state. 
Two, the treatment by as authoritative a body as the OHCHR of PA’s “endorsements” 
of human rights treaties as binding, while admitting that strictly speaking it’s not, must 
be seen as an example of what Reinisch describes as an increased blurring of the 
line between law and moral standards and as an aspect of the trend towards quasi-
legal accountability mechanisms for ensuring human rights compliance of non-state 
actors. This quasi-legal mechanism is approaching a proper legal mechanism. The 
step to opening up for holding PA legally bound by human rights, then, is being 
bridged. 
 
7.4 Israel 
In the periodic report to HRC 2001 Israel notes that  
“the overwhelming majority of powers and responsibilities in all civil spheres (including civil 
and political rights, as well as a variety of security issues, have been transferred to the 
Palestinian Council, […] In light of this changing reality, and the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Council in these areas, Israel cannot be internationally responsible for ensuring the rights 
under the ICCPR in these areas.202 
This serves as an illustration of Israel’s attitude to its own responsibility for ensuring 
the human rights compliance of PA, needless to say Israel does not in any way 
function as a guarantor for human rights in oPt, neither does the country consider 
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itself responsible to do so. It further seems to consider PA bound by human rights, as 
a non-state actor. 
 
7.5 Domestic NGOs 
A large number of NGOs monitoring the situation of human rights in oPt exist. Many 
of these focus solely on Israeli human rights breaches and are of less importance for 
the case before us. 
In their submission to HRC for the 2009 report, the Israeli Association for Civil Rights 
regret Israel’s view that the state is not bound by ICCPR in the oPt (for their own 
actions), but do not report on the human rights compliance of the PA, which must be 
taken as a sign that they do not view PA behaviour as attributable to Israel.203 The 
same approach is taken by the Palestinian human rights NGO Badil, in their 2009 
report to HRC.204 The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights, as well as al Haq, hold the same view; Israel is not 
responsible for human rights abuses committed by PA. 
A comprehensive analysis of the legal human rights responsibility of PA seems, 
however, to be lacking. 
PA is described as having a moral responsibility due to its unilateral undertakings and 
‘endorsements’ of human rights.205 
Customary International Law binding PA in its capacity of a de facto regime is often 
referred to as a legal source.206 
Domestic NGOs likewise see themselves as organizations monitoring PA compliance 
with its domestic laws, containing human rights provisions.207 
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Working methods consist largely in monitoring and reporting on PA’s breaches of 
human rights.208 The Palestinian public and the ‘international community’ are the 
main targets of their reporting. Some NGOs are directly lobbying elements of the 
PA.209 The Israeli government, or society, is never an important target for publications 
on PA human rights compliance210, other than as part of the “international 
community”.211T 
The referral to human rights as a moral responsibility, on many instances, points 
towards a non-legal understanding of “human rights”. 
In summary the NGO community, promoting human rights in relation to PA, seems to 
treat the authority like NGOs anywhere treat the sovereign state whose human rights 
compliance they want to affect.  
 
Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) 
The PA equivalent of a national human rights institution. Receives individual 
complaints, is engaged in human rights advocacy directed towards the Palestinian 
public as well as in lobbying on all levels, from the president and prime minister to the 
security branches. They are likewise involved in advocacy directed towards the 
international community.212 
PA is seen to have responsibilities under CIL and is domestically bound by the 
human rights provisions in the Palestinian Basic Law.213 
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ICHR has no contact with the Israeli government and does not perceive any interest 
from their side on the PA human rights compliance. This further suggests, in theory 
and in practice, that Israel is in no way held responsible for PA abuses. 
The organization refers to ICL as binding on PA, but admits reporting on human 
rights abuses falling outside of the scope of customary rights.214 This suggests that 
whether PA strictly speaking is bound by international human rights law, or not, is of 
less importance. 
In its latest legal report it is stated that 
 “given the fact that it has not yet become a state, the PA can not in any way join the existing 
international conventions of human rights. Therefore, the only legislative means by which the 
constitutional provisions could be implementable and apply the provisions of international 
conventions and covenants of human rights in its national legal system at this time, is through 
the integration of the provisions of those conventions and agreements, particularly the 
conventions relating to torture and illtreatment into the Palestinian national legislation.”215 
The starting point of ICHR then is to monitor PA behaviour from the perspective of 
PA’s own declared national commitments, rather than from its international 
obligations according to IHRL. 
ICHR seems to function in many ways like a national human rights institution in any 
other country. It is since 2009 permitted as a member in the ICC, the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions.216 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
A comprehensive analysis of PA’s responsibility under International Human Rights 
Law seems to be lacking among the human rights community in oPt. 
There seems to be a consensus, however, among civil society organizations,  
international organizations, Israel, PA and the “national institution”, that PA is to be 
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held directly responsible for its own abuses of human rights, and that Israel is 
relieved from its responsibility, other than for their own abuses. 
Human rights in relation to PA is today protected through a combination of “quasi-
legal” and “extra-legal” procedures holding PA directly responsible for human rights 
abuses. 
This must be interpreted as an increased willingness among the international 
community to hold de facto regimes accountable for abuses of human rights, even 
though the legal framework and accountability mechanisms are still partly missing. 
It further displays a discrepancy between the legal framework, still largely state-
focused, and practice among the UN charter-based system, NGOs, national 
institutions, in this particular case unambiguously holding the non-state actor 
responsible for its breaches of human rights. However, the somewhat stronger 
enforcement mechanisms in hands of the treaty bodies lacking. 
 
8 A pragmatic approach: Who should be held responsible for 
human rights? 
Having concluded that there are good doctrinal arguments supporting the view that 
Israel has the responsibility for the human rights compliance of PA, admitting that 
there likewise is some substance in the argument that PA itself could have binding 
obligations, while noticing that the international and domestic human rights 
community treats PA as the only body responsible for its own abuses, we must ask 
ourselves which approach best serves the aim of protecting the human rights of 
Palestinians living under PA rule. I will propose a pragmatic approach. 
Human rights have been understood to operate on three levels: as the rights of 
individuals, as state obligations and as legitimate expectations of the international 
community.217 Until now we have been dealing with obligations. If we shift our focus 
to the rights of individuals, it should be clear, from the above discussions, that the 
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Palestinians living in PA-controlled land are entitled to almost the entire scope of 
human rights. 
The authors of Human Rights and the Non-State Universe218, who try to overcome 
the discrepancy between the state-centrism of the classical human-rights paradigm 
and the increasingly fragmented post-Westphalian world of today, propose a 
functionalist approach to human rights responsibility, which focuses on governance, 
rather than solely on the state, and 
“implies a pragmatic approach to protection, promotion and enforcement. We should 
favour what works, looking for creative ways to secure human rights. The variance of 
systems of governance in our world warrants a corresponding variety of regulatory 
approaches”.219 
 
From this viewpoint the question we should ask ourselves is how best to deal with the 
fact that PA abuses human rights. 
As noted by Benvenisti, and in the analogous case of American Indian tribes by 
Cowan220, holding Israel responsible for human rights breaches of PA would imply an 
obligation on the state to intervene in the internal affairs of PA in order to secure 
compliance with Israel’s duties under international human rights law. A closer reading 
of the Oslo accords, calling for coordination of the mutual policies, might further 
suggest such a policy. 
This raises several questions. First, areas like the parts of oPt transferred to PA, 
have often been given its special status of autonomy as a solution to historic 
injustices and situations of armed conflict. For the international community to hold 
Israel responsible for breaches of its human rights commitments by PA would in 
practice effectively limit the autonomy conferred to such authorities. Holding Israel 
responsible implies a request on Israel to interfere with PA’s dealings with Palestinian 
citizens, something that most probably would lead to a higher degree of tensions and 
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not necessarily to a better, maybe worse, PA compliance with human rights law. 
Benvenisti observes that 
“Any Israeli attempt to intervene in the actual exercise of powers by the PA in the name of 
Israel’s responsibility for the protection of human rights of Palestinians would necessarily be 
viewed as a pretext for uncalled-for interference in domestic affairs. Such interference would 
not be welcomed and inevitably would lead to controversy.”221 
 
Secondly, if the granting of autonomy is a step towards enhanced enjoyment of the 
rights to self-determination222, as given by common article 1 of the UN Charter as 
well as common article 1 of ICCPR and ICESCR, the international community would 
severely limit such enjoyment by motivating the central government to interfere in the 
name of human rights protection. The right to Self-determination has an erga omnes 
nature obliging all states to support its realization.223 It appears as, in this case, there 
is a conflict between the right to self-determination, and the rest of the human rights 
spectrum, if read through the lens of a traditional state-centred approach. The self-
determination of Palestinians would, however, be further enhanced by treating PA as 
directly responsible. 
Thirdly, in oPt, as well as in similar cases, the central state, Israel, would most 
probably have a very low credibility as a human rights guarantor in an autonomous 
region, given the ongoing conflict as well as past and present severe breaches of the 
human rights of Palestinians. It seems likewise unlikely that Israel, with its already 
burdened human rights record, would like to see itself held accountable for violations 
committed by PA.224  
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Fourthly, a common argument against the extension of IHRL to armed groups is that 
these, as opposed to states, have not accepted obligations by ratifying 
conventions.225 As we have seen, PA has repeatedly expressed their will to be bound 
by IHRL, giving yet another reason to hold PA responsible. 
Lastly, and maybe most importantly, human rights were created to regulate the 
relationship between a government and the individual subject.226 This is further 
supported by the Burgos test for “jurisdiction”. Regardless of the limits to the powers 
of PA, its functional relationship to the Palestinians under its authority resembles, all 
in all, closely, if not completely, that of any government to its subjects. The human 
rights regime seems, in that situation, best fit to hold PA directly responsible. 
With these arguments in mind it seems obvious, if our aim is to improve the 
enjoyment of human rights among the Palestinians residing in oPt, that we should 
favour a development towards enhanced obligations and accountability for PA and 
similar non-state actors. Eyal Benvenisti seems to take a similar stand arguing that 
PA should be held directly responsible, and that such a responsibility should be 
spelled out227 
Approaching the question of responsibility of PA in the light of ILC’s articles on state 
responsibility or holding Israel responsible under due diligence obligations appears 
unfruitful if our aim is to protect human rights. 
The human rights community in oPt seems to have adopted the same approach, 
suggesting a development towards holding PA responsible. Whether this is followed 
by a development of positive law in the same direction remains to be seen. Anyhow, 
the case of PA seems to give credit to Clapham’s view. 
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9 Conclusions 
As a final step I will now try to wrap up the findings of this essay. 
In the first section we saw that there is strong support within IHRL to hold Israel 
responsible for PA’s abuses of human rights. The legal base for holding PA 
horizontally responsible under IHRL seems more questionable as the law stands 
today. 
The practice among human rights promoters in oPt gives evidence of a willingness to 
hold PA directly responsible, with the “extra-legal” and “quasi-legal” means available. 
From a pragmatic approach there are likewise strong arguments to hold PA directly 
responsible. 
This points towards the desirability of a clear recognition of horizontal human rights 
obligations of de facto regimes. If our aim is to protect human rights, we should 
favour such an evolvement. 
This should be coupled with corresponding mechanisms for accountability for such 
structures of governance as PA. 
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